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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS
AUTHORITY TO HEAR AND DECIDE A MATTER
OVER WHICH THE SUPREME COURT HAS
ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE
JURISDICTION; NAMELY, A CAPITAL FELONY
CONVICTION, PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN.
§78-2-2(4)(a).

2.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
RENDERED A DECISION SO FAR DEPARTING
FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN FAILING TO
ADDRESS POINT ONE AS CONTAINED
IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF AS TO CALL FOR AN
EXERCISE OF THIS COURTfS POWER OF
SUPERVISION.

REFERENCE TO REPORTS OF OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is a petition
requestinq this Court' to review the official Opinion filed
November 21, 1989, in the Utah Court of Appeals involvinq the
case State of Utah v. Robert Eugene Jones,

The Opinion is

attached hereto in the Appendix as Exhibit 2.
-4-

JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review
Defendant's Writ of Certiorari pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-22(3)(a) and (5) and Rule 42 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court.

The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals pertinent

hereto was filed November 21, 1989.

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(4)(a):
"The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals
any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has

original

appellate

jurisidctxon,

except:

(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an
interlocutory order of a court of record involving a
charge of a capital felony."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, ROBERT EUGENE JONES, was charged on or about
March 14, 1983, by Information with Murder in the First Degree, a
Capital Offense; Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree Felony; and
Attempted Murder in the First Degree, a First Degree Felony (R.
If 2, 3 ) . Defendant was convicted as charged in a trial by jury

held August

29, 1983,

through

September

7, 1983,

in the

Second

Judicial District Court, the Honorable Ronald 0, Hyde, presiding
(R. 68-83).

On September 15, 1983, Judge Hyde sentenced

Defendant to the Utah State Prison for terms as follows:

Life on

the charge of Murder in the First Degree, a Capital Offense; Not
-5-

Less than Five Years and May Be for Life on the charge of
Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree Felony; and Not Less than
Five Years and May Be for Life on the charge of Attempted
Criminal Homicide, First Degree Felony (R, 149-151, 155). The
sentences were run concurrent (R. 170). A Notice of Appeal was
filed on October 13, 1983 (R. 166) .
Defendant's case was reversed on appeal by the Utah
Supreme Court February 26, 1987, and remanded for a new trial (R.
1851)

Attorney Ginger Fletcher entered as counsel for Defendant

on April 28, 1987 (R. 1860).

Defendant was convicted in a second

trial by jury held June 22-30, 1987, in the Second Judicial
District court, the Honorable David E. Roth presiding (R. 19061916, 2095, 2099, 2105).

When Defendant was convicted the second

time, he was convicted of the following offenses:

Murder in the

First Degree (R. 2099); Aggravated Burglary (2105); and of lesser
included offense of Attempted Second Degree Murder, a Second
Degree Felony (R. 2095).
On July 13, 1987, Defendant's attorney, Ginger
Fletcher, moved to withdraw as Defendant's counsel due to an
apparent conflict with the Defendant, which Motion was granted
(R. 2108, 2862-2863).

Attorney Robert L. Froerer, an attorney

with the Weber County Public Defenders Association, entered as
defense counsel July 20, 1987 (R. 2109).

On September 2, 1987,

Judge Roth sentenced the Defendant to the Utah State Prison for
terms as follows:

Life in Prison on the charge of Murder in the

First Degree, a Capital Offense; Not Less than Five Years and May
-6-

Be for Life on the charge of Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree
Felony (R. 2181); and Not Less then One nor More Than 15 Years on
the charge of Attempted Second Degree Murder, a Second Degree
Felony (R, 2183).

All sentencing terms were run concurrent (R.

2129, 2130).
Defendant filed, pro se, a Motion for New Trial on the
morning of September 9, 1987 (R. 2148), while on the same day in
the afternoon Defendant's attorney, without knowledge of the
prior filing by Defendant, filed a Notice of Appeal (R. 2180,
2185).

That appeal was subsequently voluntarily dismissed on

defense counsel's motion on January 12, 1988 (R. 2804).
After some delay in Defendant's actions attempting to
appoint new counsel (R. 2805, et. seq., 2836, 2839), a hearing on
Defendant's Motion for New Trial was held on July 19, 1988 (R.
2845), which Motion was denied by Judge Roth (R. 2848).

A Notice

of Appeal was filed with the Utah Supreme Court August 5, 1988
(R. 2851) .
During the briefing period, but prior to oral
arguments, the Supreme Court transfered the case to the Court of
Appeals (Appendix, Exhibit 1 ) . The Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower Court's decision in its Opinion filed November 21, 1989
(Appendix, Exhibit 2 ) .

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Issue One
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS AUTHORITY TO
HEAR AND DECIDE A MATTER OVER WHICH THE SUPREME COURT
-7-

HAS ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE JURISDICTION;
NAMELY, A CAPITAL FELONY CONVICTION, PURSUANT TO UTAH
CODE ANN. §78-2-2(4) (a) .
Pursuant to the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court and
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4)(a), a Notice of Appeal was originally
filed in this matter with the Utah Supreme Court on August 5,
1988 (R. 2851).

Appellant's Brief was subsequently filed on or

about March 15, 1988, in the Utah Supreme Court.
On or about May 23, 1989, counsel received notification
that this matter had been assigned to the Court of Appeals (see
Appendix, Exhibit 1 ) . It is the memory of Defendant's counsel
that notice was also received from the Utah Supreme Court
assigning the case to the Court of Appeals, but such notice is
not available to include herein.

The Respondent's Brief and the

Appellant's Reply Brief were subsequently filed in the Utah Court
of Appeals.

Oral arguments were heard, and a decision rendered

and filed November 21, 1989, affirming the conviction and
sentence of the lower Court.
Issue Two
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS RENDERED A DECISION
SO FAR DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN FAILING TO ADDRESS POINT ONE AS
CONTAINED IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF AS TO CALL FOR AN
OF THIS COURT'S POWER OF SUPERVISION.
Prior to Defendant's first trial and after an
evaluation which took place at the State Hospital, a hearing was
held May 10, 1983, in which Defendant was found to be incompetent
to stand trial and was remanded to the custody of the Utah State
Hospital (R. 47-54).

On June 13, 1983, another hearing was held,
-8-

at which Defendant was found competent to stand trial (R. 55) .
At the first trial, members of his family testified that after
the Defendant got out of his military service, he seemed to have
changed.

He was like two different people.

His sister, Doris

Kennedy, testified that one minute he is one person and the next
he is someone else, and the someone else isn't a very nice
person.

He's ornery and irrational (R. 1035-1037).

She further

testified that when Defendant changed, his physical
characteristics would also change, including his voice and facial
appearance (R. 1040).
Defendant's father, Robert Jones, Sr., testified that
when Defendant was in the military, the chaplain called him and
said that he felt his son was mentally ill and he should try to
get him out of the service (R. 1149).

He further testified that

when his brother, Denny, died in 1967, Defendant was devastated,
and that the Defendant had been in and out of mental institutions
eight to ten times during the last eight years (R. 1151) .
Bobbie Jones, Defendant's mother, testified that while
Defendant was in the Army he was put in a mental hospital in
Colorado after he went AWOL (R. 1102).

She further testified

that Defendant had been in other mental hospitals, and that he
had been working with the mental health department for over eight
years (R. 1103) .

She further testified that generally he is a

sweet, beautiful person that you love to be around, but that he
seemed to turn into a second person (R. 1105 and 1106) .
The other victim in this shooting, Beverly Jones,
-9-

testified in the preliminary hearing prior to the first trial
that while in the Chapman residence, she thought the Defendant
was crazy and "looked like he was high on something.

He wasn't

the same Robert...it was just a different, whole different
personality, like a really rotten mean person" (R. 39). She
further stated that, having known him for quite awhile, that at
times he was pretty rational and decent, and that at other times
he was not, and that on that night his eyes appeared to be glazed
over (R. 40). She testified similarly in Defendant's first trial
as well (R. 993, 994) .
Nathan Joseph Webster, who was a police officer
assisting in the arrest of the Defendant, described him in the
first trial as being incoherent and agreed that Defendant's "eyes
were glazed, appeared to be somebody that if you didn't know
anything else about him that he would either be heavily
intoxicated or medicated or been through some harrowing
experience."

(R. 722, 723.)

In Defendant's second trial

sentencing hearing, Officer Webster testified that when he first
saw Defendant he had a glazed or dazed look (R. 2723).
Though, as indicated above, Defendant had a long
history of mental problems, the issue of mental competency was
not raised1 during his second trial.

However, during the

sentencing phase of the second trial, Dr. Alma Carlisle, the head
of the psychology department at the Utah State Prison, testified
regarding the mental problems suffered by Defendant.
Dr. Carlisle testified that Defendant suffered from two
-10-

distinct mental illnesses/disorders.

One is a multiple

personality disorder (R. 2688 and 2715, see also 2686).

It was

also Dr• Carlisle1s opinion that the Defendant suffers from
another mental illness called bi-polar disorder or manicdepressive disorder (R. 2692-2693 and 2686) ,
A stipulation was entered into between Defendant and
the state in which it was aqreed that Dr. Van Austin, a
psychiatrist, would testify, had he been present at the hearinq,
that Defendant is sufferinq from manic-depression and is takinq
lithium for treatment of such (R. 2726).
Dr. Carlisle testified that it's possible that one
sufferinq from manic-depression or bi-polar disorder miqht commit
a crime wherein his behavior is a product of the mental illness
(R. 2716) and, further, that, in reqard to the multiple
personality illness, one sufferinq from such is not totally in
control as one whole person is (R. 2699, 2675, 2676, 2677).
Dr. Carlisle also testified that a normal person's
thouqht processes would be consistent in committinq a crime from
beqinninq to end, and that there "seems to be more responsibility
for that [type of] individual than for a multiple, who is, to a
deqree, out of control" (R. 2718).
After the evidence was presented to the Court at
Defendant's sentencinq hearinq September 1, 1987, before the
Honorable David E. Roth, the Court stated the followinq:
"This is a sentencinq hearinq, and I'm not here to
determine whether the Defendant had a disorder that
would, or an illness that would, excuse his conduct or
the offense. Obviously, those issues, if they were
-11-

qoinq to be raised, would have been raised at trial.
THEY WERE NOT." [Emphasis added.]
(R. 2750-2751.)
ARGUMENT
Point One
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NO AUTHORITY TO HEAR AND
DECIDE A MATTER OVER WHICH THE SUPREME COURT HAS
ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE JURISDICTION;
NAMELY, A CAPITAL FELONY CONVICTION, PURSUANT TO UTAH
CODE ANN. §78-2-2(4)(a).
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (4) (a) , the Utah
Supreme Court has original and arguably exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over capital felony convictions.

This particular

grant of jurisdiction is exclusive to the Supreme Court, in that
the Utah Code has prescribed which cases the Supreme Court
may transfer to the Court of Appeals and which cases it must
retain.

The Code clearly reserves review of capital felony

convictions and certain other matters as listed therein to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Subject matter jurisdiction is exclusive to eh Court
which has jurisdiction over the offense.

Objections to such

cannot be waived.
"With respect to objections to the jurisdiction of the
Court in criminal prosecutions, a distinction is to be
made between those which involved jurisdiction of
fundamental rights of accused and those which involve
merely personal privileges of accused; the former
cannot be waived, but the latter can.
"Accordingly, objections on the ground that the Court
is not a legal Court or that it has no jurisdiction
over the offense or subject matter or that the
indictment information or Complaint fails to charge an
offense cannot be waived, but may be raised at any
-12-

time." 22 CJS §175, Criminal Law, p. 212, See also
Johnson v. State, 611 P.2d 1137, 1145 (Okla., 1980).
See also State ex eel. Baumert v. Municipal Court of
the City of Phoenix, 606 P. 2d 33 (Ariz. App. 1979).
Defendant hereby asserts his objection to the exercise
of jurisdiction by the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter as
being improper.
Based on the fact that this case was transfered by the
Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals without authority
to do so, the decision rendered by the Utah Court of Appeals must
be stricken and held to be void.

Defendant's appeal must proceed

through the Utah Supreme Court as if a transfer to the Utah Court
of Appeals had never taken place.
Point Two
THE COURT OF APPEALS RENDERED A DECISION SO FAR
DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN FAILING TO ADDRESS POINT ONE AS
CONTAINED IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF AS TO CALL FOR AN
EXERCISE OF THIS COURT1S POWER OF SUPERVISION.
The standard of review applied to cases where the
assistance of prior counsel is challenged has been established by
the United States Supreme Court.

The Court has stated, "To

succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires
a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the 'counsel1 guaranteed the Defendant by the
Sixth Amendment and that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense."

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, reh'g denied,

467 U.S. 1267 (1984), 80 L.Ed.2d 674; see also State v.
Morehouse, 748 P.2d 219 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. Frame, 723
P.2d 401 (Utah, 1986).

And further, in order to show prejudice
-13-

to his case, defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.

A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
the confidence of the outcome.

Str ickland, 466 U.S. at 649, see

also Morehouse, 748 P.2d at 219; State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d
1019, 1023 (Utah, 1987); State v. Wynia, 82 Utah Adv. Rep. 16.
Defendant claims the following deficiency:

Counsel

Ginger Fletcher did not bring to light in any manner Defendant's
mental illness/disorders, even though ample evidence was
available regarding a long history of mental illness suffered by
Defendant.
As noted above, several witnesses testified in
Defendant's first trial regarding the history of his mental
condition.

They described that at one point in time Defendant

would be a nice person, but then he would switch and become an
ornery and irrational person.

His history in and out of mental

hospitals and treatment programs was also outlined fully, as set
forth above (pp. 8-10, supra).
Dr. Alma Carlisle, the head psychologist at the Utah
State Prison, testified in Defendant's sentencing hearing (second
trial) about the mental illnesses suffered by Defendant, calling
one a multiple personality disorder and the other a bi-polar
disorder, or manic-depressive illness.

Dr. Carlisle also

testified that one suffering from multiple personality disorder
is not totally in control as one whole person is, and further
-14-

that there seems to be more responsibility for an individual who
would have consistent thought processes than for a multiple who,
to a degree, is out of control (pp. 10-12, supra).
These facts raise the issue of whether or not the
Defendant had the capacity to form the intent required by statute
to commit the crimes he was charged with,
101, et seq.; §76-2-305.

tltah Code Ann. §76-2-

The issue of whether or not the

Defendant was competent to stand trial and the effect of
Defendant's mental illnesses in relation to his ability to form
the requisite intent should have been addressed prior to and/or
during Defendant's second trial.

Utah Code Ann. §77-14-3•

The

lower Court refused to address this issue at Defendant's
sentencing hearing after prior counsel withdrew because the issue
was not raised during the trial (R. 2750-2751).

Certainly a

finder of fact would find such facts very interesting, and to
have such evidence before them might w£ll bp dispositive of the
case .
The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
Defendant's conviction is not supported by the evidence.
Defendant argues that prior counsel was ineffective and failed to
present available evidence of Defendant's mental illness/
disorders to the jury.

The Court of Appeals chose not to

address the issue pertaining to Defendant's mental illness/
disorders, stating that prior counsel's conduct consisted of
legitimate trial strategy or resulted in no prejudice to
Defendant, specifically citing in Footnote 8 of the Opinion that
•15-

the testimony at Defendant's sentencing hearing given by Dr• Alma
Carlisle, a Utah State Prison psychologist, negated theories that
Defendant was incompetent to stand trial or lacked the capacity
to form the requisite intent to commit the crimes (Opinion, p.
9} .
However, a review of the record indicated above shows a
marked difference between Dr. Carlisle's actual statements and
the Utah Court of Appeals1 interpretation of those statements.
The Defendant has a long history of mental problems.

The issues

of mental competency and Defendant's inability to form the
requisite intent were not raised during his second trial.

The

Court of Appeals should have addressed this obvious failure on
the part of Defendant's prior counsel.

CONCLUSION
Defendant believes that his case was improperly
transfered from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of
Appeals pursuant to the statute cited herein and hereby objects
thereto.
He further contends, as a second issue, that the Utah
Court of Appeals rendered a decision that so far sanctioned a
departure from the accepted and usual view of judicial
proceedings by a lower Court as to call for an exercise of this
Court's power of supervision (referencing his argument pertaining
to failure of the Utah Court of Appeals to address the issues of
his mental condition) .
-16-

Based on the foregoing issues and arguments, Defendant
respectfully requests this Court to grant him a review of this
matter in full.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^k)^

d^y of December, 1989,

IL4rf''.

'AM^

ROBERT L. FROERER
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the </-[bA <$ay of December,
1989, I mailed, postage prepaid, four true artd correct copies of
the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari to R. Paul Van Dam,
Attorney General, and Sandra Sjogren, Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Respondent, at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City,
UT 84114.
h

/U)tW\

ROBERT L . FROERER
A t t o r n e y for Defendant
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R. Paul Van Dam
State Attorney General
Governmental Affairs
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Re:

State v. Jones
Court of Appeals No*

890332-CA

Dear Counsel:
The above-referenced case has been assigned to the Court of Appeals.
Further proceedings will be handled by this court. Please note that
the case number at the Court of Appeals is 890332-CA and should be
indicated on all future filings.
The Court of Appeals will observe the due date established by the
Supreme Court for the respondent's brief, which is June 7, 1989.
Sincerely,

Julia Whitfield
Case Management Clerk
cc:
Second District Court
Weber County
Criminal No. 15283

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

NOy.211989

OOOOO

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

FILED

OPINION
(For Publication)

5cyT Noor*n
»rK of *« Court
t\ C«urt & Appeals

Case No. 890332-CA

v.
Robert Jones,
Defendant and Appellant.

Second District, Weber County
The Honorable David E. Roth
Attorneys:

Robert L. Froerer, Ogden, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Sandra L. Sjogren, Salt
Lake City, for Respondent

Before Judges Bench, Greenwood and Croft.1

x

GREENWOOD, Judge:
Defendant Robert Jones appeals his convictions of first
degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and aggravated
burglary in connection with the murder of Kim Chapman (Kim) and
the shooting of Beverly Jones (Beverly). Defendant urges
reversal of his conviction, claiming that he was denied
effective counsel.
Defendant, who is not related to Beverly by blood or
marriage, met her in 1979. They later began living together in
a home Beverly purchased next door to defendant's parents.
Their relationship deteriorated, and in October 1982, defendant
moved out of Beverly's home and in with his parents next door.
In November 1982, Beverly began dating Kim. Beverly
testified at trial that defendant frequently followed and
threatened them. Once, the police were summoned when defendant
1. Bryant H. Croft, Senior district judge sitting by special
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp.
1989).

Go
H
i-3
to

confronted them at a bowling alley armed with, what appeared to
Beverly to be, a pistol. Beverly also testified that on
February 16, 1983, defendant entered her home and held her at
gunpoint. According to Beverly, defendant told her that he
would wait for Kim to arrive to blow his head off. Beverly
managed to telephone Kim who then called the police. Defendant
was charged criminally as a result, and a hearing was set for
the week after March 11, 1983. Following this incident,
Beverly stayed in the basement of Kim's parents' home at
night. In March 1983, just prior to the shooting, defendant
offered a friend $5,000 to assist him in killing Kim and asked
another acquaintance to help him disguise himself so Kim and
Beverly would not recognize him when he went after them.
On the evening of March 11, 1983, defendant entered the
Chapman home. Kim's parents, Earl and Eva Chapman were
upstairs in bed, Beverly's children were in their beds in a
basement bedroom, and Kim and Beverly were in the main room of
the basement watching television. According to Beverly's
testimony, defendant suddenly appeared from the basement
hallway carrying a gun. He instructed her to tie Kim's hands
with a rope and then with a cord, but she pretended to be
unable to do so. At approximately twenty inches distance,
defendant then pointed the gun at Kim. When Kim reached out to
touch defendant's arms, defendant fired the gun, striking Kim
in the chest. Defendant then fired a series of shots at
Beverly, striking her in the hand and right flank. Another
shot struck Kim in the forehead. Defendant then fled the scene.
Although defendant did not testify at trial, his counsel
claimed that defendant did not enter the Chapman home intending
to shoot Kim and Beverly, but to convince Beverly to leave Kim
and go away with him. Allegedly, a struggle broke out during
which defendant, in self-defense or by accident, shot Kim and
Beverly.
Immediately following the shooting, Earl Chapman and Eva
Chapman went down to the basement. After surveying the scene,
they went upstairs, called the police, and waited for help.
Neither the Chapmans nor the police found a gun in the basement.
Later that night, defendant appeared at the home of an
off-duty sheriff's deputy and said he thought he had just
killed someone. Months later, in the early part of the summer
of 1983, defendant told a police officer, who was transporting
defendant, that he killed Kim.
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The jury convicted defendant of first degree murder for
the killing of Kim, attempted first degree murder for the
shooting of Beverly, and aggravated burglary. On appeal/ the
Utah Supreme Court reversed defendant's conviction and remanded
the case for a new trial for reasons unrelated to this
appeal.2 After a second trial, the jury found defendant
guilty of first degree murder, attempted second degree murder,
and aggravated burglary. Following a hearing, the district
court denied defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground
that trial counsel was ineffective.
On appeal, defendant claims he was denied effective
assistance of counsel and cites five specific instances where
his counsel's conduct was assertedly prejudicial: (1) failure
to pursue a theory regarding chain of custody of the murder
weapon; (2) failure to present evidence of defendant's alleged
mental illness; (3) lack of consultation and misleading
statements by counsel to defendant; (4) calling only three
witnesses out of the twenty-three who were subpoenaed; and (5)
failure to adequately cross-examine witnesses.
INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the United States
Supreme Court standard in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984), for determining the existence of ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial. State v. Gardner, 101 Utah
Adv. Rep. 3, 12 (1989); State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886, 893
(Utah 1989); State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 118-19 n. 2 (Utah
1989). To establish ineffectiveness of counsel under the
Strickland standard, "a defendant must show, first, that his or
her counsel rendered a deficient performance in some
demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and, second, that
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." Carter, 776
P.2d at 893. Further, H[o]n appeal, defendant must overcome
the strong presumption that his counsel's assistance was
adequate," State v. Moritzskv. 771 P.2d 688, 690 (Utah Ct. App.
1989), and "exercised reasonable professional judgment." State
v. Bullock. 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 36 (1989). See also
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405
(Utah 1986) .

2.

State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473 (Utah 1987).
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1.

CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF GUN

We first examine defendant's claim that counsel's failure
to pursue evidence concerning the chain of custody of the
murder weapon, constituted ineffectiveness of counsel. With
regard to custody of the murder weapon, defense counsel had
access to the following information: (1) although defendant
had purchased two .38 caliber guns, one of which he gave to
Beverly, and had been given another .38 caliber gun by Roger
Birt prior to the shooting, none of these three guns were used
in the shooting; (2) Officer Norm Soaki of the Ogden City
Police Department, obtained a .38 caliber gun from a pawn shop
that ballistics tests and Chris Singleton identified as the
weapon that shot Kim and Beverly; (3) Harvey Blarney, the
registered owner of the gun used in the shooting, purchased the
gun prior to the shooting from a pawn shop in Ogden and the
same day gave the gun to Renold Hastie; (4) Hastie and Norwood
Fridal used the gun in a series of armed robberies prior to and
after the shooting; (5) Hastie sold the gun to Chris Singleton,
who then gave the gun to Mike McDill, who, at Singleton's
request, pawned the gun; (6) Hastie and Fridal denied having
known defendant at the time of the shooting; (7) Soaki
testified at the first trial, that he was unable to connect
Singleton, Hastie or Fridal to defendant; (8) defendant's
father told counsel, John Caine and Maurice Richards, who
represented defendant during the first trial, that Beverly was
connected to some of the people involved in the custody chain;
(9) in his motion for a new trial, defendant alleged that Chris
Norvall, his ex-wife, was somehow connected to Hastie and
Fridal and had a social relationship with Beverly; (10) in an
evidentiary hearing after the first trial, Caine and Richards
admitted they were unable to connect Hastie or Fridal to
Beverly; (11) in the same evidentiary hearing, Soaki testified
he was unable to connect Singleton, Hastie, or Fridal to
Beverly; (12) an affidavit of Soaki states that defendant's
sister, Le Ann Carter, personally led Soaki to Hastie's house
and toid Soaki that the resident of the house was a good friend
of defendant and might have the gun; and (13) counsel for the
State testified that there were rumors that defendant was a
"wheelman" for the robberies committed by Hastie and Fridal.
Defendant claims he was unarmed when he entered the
Chapman house. He hypothesizes that Beverly had brought the
gun into the Chapman basement. According to defendant, Beverly
obtained the gun from defendant's ex-wife, Chris Norvall, who
defendant alleges is linked with Fridal and Hastie. Defendant
conjectures that immediately following the shooting, Beverly,
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although wounded# retrieved the gun and hid it. She then
enlisted the help of an accomplice who retrieved the gun from
the Chapman basement and returned it to Norvall who then
returned it to Fridal and Hastie.
In the second trial, counsel did not pursue the gun
custody issue. A ballistics expert testified regarding the
bullets fired from the murder weapon, but made no mention of
which gun fired the bullets. The only reference made to the
identification of a gun during trial was the testimony of Roger
Birt. Birt testified that he and defendant, shortly before the
shooting, practiced shooting with the .38 caliber gun that he
had purchased for defendant.
Defendant asserts that counsel's performance was markedly
deficient because counsel failed to tell the jury that the
weapon Birt referred to was not the gun used in the shooting
and failed to probe the gun's custody chain. Probing the gun
custody issue would have, according to defendant, supported his
claim that he was unarmed when he entered the Chapman home.
Defendant contends that proving he was unarmed when he entered
the Chapman home would have corroborated his claim that he
entered the home solely to talk with Beverly, thereby negating
the applicable intent elements of the aggravated burglary,3
first degree murder4
3.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1978) states in pertinent part:
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with
intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on
any person.

4. Utah Code Ann, § 76-5-202 (Supp. 1989) states in pertinent
part:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first degree
if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of
another under any of the following circumstances:

(c) The actor knowingly created a great risk of
death to a person other than the victim and the actor.
(d) The homicide was committed while the actor
was engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit . . .
aggravated burglary, burglary • . . .
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and attempted second degree murder,5 charges of which he was
convicted.6
a. COUNSEL•S PERFORMANCE
When assessing counsel's performance, we will not second
guess trial counsel's legitimate use of judgment as to trial
strategy. Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1110 (Utah 1983);
State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). "Trial
tactics lie within the prerogative of counsel and may not be
dictated by his [or her] client. Decisions as to what . . .
defenses to interpose are generally left to the professional
judgment of counsel." Carter, 776 P.2d at 894 n.31 (quoting
State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 91 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 459
U.S. 988 (1982).
Counselfs decision to avoid pursuing the chain of custody
issue was a reasonable trial strategy. Attempting to show that
defendant was incapable of intentionally or knowingly shooting
Kim and Beverly, counsel wanted to portray a lovesick and
cowardly defendant with only one problem in life: his
affection for Beverly. Probing the custody issue would have
required an
5. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1989) states in pertinent
part:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the second
degree if the actor:
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the death
of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to
another, he commits an act clearly dangerous to human life
that causes the death of another . . . .
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a
depraved indifference to human life, he engages in conduct
which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby
causes the death of another . . . .
6. In his brief, defendant also argues that Beverly's alleged
invitation to him to visit her at the Chapman home negated the
element of burglary requiring an unlawful entry, see section
76-6-202(1), and further supported his claim that his sole
intent was to see Beverly. Although in the first trial,
defendant testified that Beverly invited him to the Chapman
home and told him where to find the key, defendant mistakenly
states that this point was made in the second trial. We find
nowhere in the record where this fact was presented to the jury.
890332-CA
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in-depth cross examination of Officer Soaki and disclosure of
defendant's alleged connection with armed robbers, thus
weakening defendant's position.
The soundness of counsel's judgment is substantiated by
the determination of defendant's counsel in the first trial,
Caine and Richards, to also avoid pursing the custody issue.
At trial, they elicited a statement from Officer Soaki that he
could not tie the murder weapon to defendant and then they
promptly terminated the cross-examination. During the
evidentiary hearing that followed the trial, they testified
that they avoided the custody issue to prevent Soaki from
connecting defendant to Hastie and Fridal. Counsel for the
State, on the other hand, testified that they hoped Caine and
Richards would pursue the custody issue so they could present
information to the jury connecting defendant to Hastie and
Fridal.
Admittedly, important distinctions exist between the first
and second trials. First, because the death penalty was not
imposed in the first trial, it was a nonfactor in the second
trial. Caine and Richards admitted they were trying in the
first trial, to present defendant in the most positive light to
avoid the death penalty. Second, Caine and Richards
inaccurately assumed that the murder weapon was one of the two
.38 caliber guns defendant had purchased. In the second trial,
counsel knew the actual identity of the murder weapon. Third,
Caine and Richards were unaware of Blarney and McDill's
involvement in the chain of custody and of Singleton's
identifying the gun as the murder weapon prior to the
ballistics tests. These facts were known to counsel in the
second trial.
These differences, however, did not necessitate a change
in strategy in the second trial. Caine and Richards testified
that although the additional information would have
corroborated defendant's story that he did not take the gun to
the house, they had serious reservations about the wisdom of
pursuing the custody issue because of the danger of linking
defendant with Hastie and Fridal. Further, even though counsel
was not faced with the possibility of a death penalty in the
second trial, they still wanted to convince the jury that
defendant was simply an unarmed heartbroken intruder, who
lacked the courage and requisite intent or knowledge to commit
the crimes. Linking defendant to Hastie and Fridal could have
tarnished their portrayal of defendant. "Whenever there is a
legitimate exercise of professional judgment in the choice of
trial strategy, the fact that it did not produce the expected
result does not constitute ineffectiveness of counsel."
Bullock, 119 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36.
890332-CA
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We find that defendant has not sufficiently shown that the
decision made by trial counsel to eschew the chain of custody
theory was not merely tactical choices or that counsel's
performance in this regard falls below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment.
b.

PREJUDICE

To demonstrate that counsel's performance prejudiced him,
defendant has the burden to "affirmatively show that a
reasonable probability exists that except for ineffective
counsel/ the result would have been different."7 Verde, 770
P.2d at 119 n.2. (quoting State v. Lovell. 758 P.2d 909, 913
(Utah 1988)). We find it highly unlikely that the result would
have been different had counsel pursued the custody issue.
Although proving that he was unarmed when he entered the
Chapman home may have bolstered his defense that he lacked the
requisite intent to shoot Kim and Beverly, we are struck by the
improbability of defendant's theory that Beverly hid the gun
after being shot. Several witnesses, including Kim Chapman's
parents and police officers, testified that there was no gun at
the scene after defendant left. Save his own opinion that
Beverly was somehow connected to Chris Norvall, Hastie, and
Fridal, defendant offers no evidence to support his theory.
Furthermore, the evidence presented at trial
overwhelmingly indicates that defendant intended to seriously
harm Kim and Beverly. Defendant twice admitted that he shot
Kim and Beverly; he previously threatened to kill them both; he
approached others to help him carry out his murder plans; he
purchased a gun and practiced shooting prior to the shooting;
and he was facing criminal charges for previously assaulting
Beverly in her home.
We find it improbable that the jury would have decided
differently if the gun custody issue had been pursued. We,
therefore, hold that defendant, by inadequately showing
prejudice and deficiency of performance by counsel under the
Strickland test, fails to overcome the strong presumption of
effective counsel.
7. This court may consider the two issues of (1) whether the
conduct of counsel was below the specified standard and (2)
whether the conduct prejudiced defendant in what ever order
seems appropriate, State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 n.27
(Utah 1989), and in some cases, resolution of one issue may
obviate the need to deal with the other. In this case,
however, we believe the issue of prejudice relative to the gun
custody issue was sufficiently problematic to merit analysis.
890332-CA
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2.

OTHER ALLEGED DEFICIENCIES

Following a thorough review of the record and briefs
before us, we find that the remaining allegations of deficient
performance that defendant argues constitute ineffective
counsel/ are without merit. Generally/ the conduct cited by
defendant consists of legitimate trial strategy8 or resulted
in no prejudice to defendant. Recognizing that we "need not
analyze and address in writing each and every argument/ issue/
or claim raised properly before us on appeal/- Carter, 776 P.2d
at 888/ we decline to detail our analysis of the remaining four
deficiencies. To address them would amount to unecessary
verbiage and a redundant literary exercise. I£. at 889. We
state, simply/ that defendant fails to demonstrate that the
remaining deficiencies show that his counsel rendered a
deficient performance below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment and that counsel's performance prejudiced
the defendant.

Affirmed.

Pamela T. Greenwood/ Judge

WE CONCUR:

8. For example, defendant claims his counsel should have
argued he was incompetent to stand trial or lacked the capacity
to form the requisite intent to commit the crimes. Testimony
at defendant's sentencing hearing/ however/ by Dr. Alma
Carlisle, a Utah State Prison psychologist, negated those
theories. Exclusion of the theories was, therefore, a
legitimate trial strategy.
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PART 1
CULPABILITY GENERALLY

76-2-101. Requirements of criminal conduct
and criminal responsibility.
No person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct
is prohibited by law and:
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, or with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining the offense, as the definition of the offense
requires; or
(2) His acts constitute an offense involving
strict liability.

These standards of criminal responsibility shall not
apply to the violations set forth in Title 41, Chapter
6, unless specifically provided by law.
1983
76-2-102. Culpable mental state required —
Strict liability.
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental state, and when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable mental
state and the offense does not involve strict liability,
intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. An offense shall involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense
clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for commission of the conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof of any
culpable mental state.
1963
76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with
intent or willfully"; "knowingly, or
with knowledge"; "recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal negligence or
criminally negligent."
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully
with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or
cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the
nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when
he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain
to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously 'disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally
negligent with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct
when he ought to be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or
the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of
care that an ordinary person would exercise in
all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.
1974
76-2-104. Conduct — When defined as offense.
Conduct is an offense if a person engages in it with
criminal negligence. Conduct is also an offense if a
person engages in it intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly. Conduct is an offense if a person engages
in it recklessly, the conduct is an offense also if a
person engages in it intentionally or knowingly. Conduct is an offense if a person engages in it knowingly,
the conduct is an offense also if a person engages m it
intentionally
1973

ou
not entrapped, such issue may be presented by the
defendant to the jury at trial. Any order by the court
dismissing a case based on entrapment shall be appealable by the state.
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the
defense of entrapment is an issue, past offenses of the
defendant shall not be admitted except that in a trial
where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his
past convictions for felonies and any testimony given
by the defendant at a hearing on entrapment may be
used to impeach his testimony at trial.
1973
76-2-304. Ignorance or mistake of fact or l a w .
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves the culpable mental state
is a defense to any prosecution for that crime.
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence
or meaning of a penal law is no defense to a crime
unless:
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor
reasonably believed his conduct did not constitute an offense, and
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the
actor's reasonable reliance upon:
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a written order or grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by
law with responsibility for interpreting the
law in question; or
(ii) A written interpretation of the law
contained in an opinion of a court of record or
made by a public servant charged by law
with responsibility for interpreting the law
in question.
(3) Although an actor's ignorance or mistake of
fact or law may constitute a defense to the offense
charged, he may nevertheless be convicted of a lesser
included offense of which he would be guilty if the
fact or law were as he believed.
1974
76-2-304.5. Mistake as to victim's age not a defense.

(1) It is not a defense to the crime of child kidnaping, a violation of Section 76-5-301.1; rape of a child,
a violation of Section 76-5-402.1; object rape of a
child, a violation of Section 76-5-402.3; sodomy upon
a child, a violation of Section 76-5-403.1; or sexual
abuse of a child, a violation of Section 76-5-404.1; or
an attempt to commit any of those offenses, that the
actor mistakenly believed the victim to be 14 years of
age or older at the time of the alleged offense or was
unaware of the victim's true age.
(2) It is not a defense to the crime of unlawful sexual intercourse, a violation of Section 76-5-401, or an
attempt to commit that crime, that the actor mistakenly believed the victim to be 16 years of age or older
at the time of the alleged offense or was unaware of
the victim's true age.
1983
76-2-305.

Mental illness — Use as a defense —
Influence of alcohol or other substance
voluntarily consumed — Definition.

(1) It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute or ordinance that the defendant, as a result of
mental illness, lacked the mental state required as an
element of the offense charged. Mental illness is not
otherwise a defense.
(2) The defense defined in this section includes the
defenses known as "insanity" and "diminished mental capacity."
(3) A person who is under the influence of voluntarily consumed or injected alcohol, controlled substances, or volatile substances at the time of the al-

leged offense is not excused from criminal responsibility on the basis of mental illness.
(4) "Mental illness" means a mental disease or defect. A mental defect may be a congenital condition or
one the result of injury or a residual effect of a physical or mental disease. Mental illness does not mean a
personality or character disorder or abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal conduct. 1986
76-2-306. Voluntary intoxication.
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a
criminal charge unless such intoxication negates the
existence of the mental state which is an element of
the offense; however, if recklessness or criminal negligence establishes an element of an offense and the
actor is unaware of the n s k because of voluntary intoxication, his unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution for that offense.
1973
76-2-307.

Voluntary termination of efforts prior
to offense.
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution in
which an actor's criminal responsibility arises from
his own conduct or from being a party to an offense
under Section 76-2-201 176-2-202] that prior to the
commission of the offense, the actor voluntarily terminated his effort to promote or facilitate its commission and either:

(1) Gave timely warning to the proper law enforcement authorities or the intended victim; or
(2) Wholly deprives h i s prior efforts of effectiveness in the commission.
1973
76-2-308. Affirmative defenses.
Defenses enumerated in this part constitute affirmative defenses.
1973
PART 4
JUSTIFICATION EXCLUDING CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY
76-2-401.

Justification as defense — When allowed.
Conduct which is justified is a defense to prosecution for any offense based on the conduct. The defense
of justification may be claimed:

(1) When the actor's conduct is in defense of
persons or property under the circumstances described in Sections 76-2-402 through 76-2-406 of
this part;
(2) When the actor's conduct is reasonable and
in fulfillment of his duties as a governmental officer or employee;
(3) When the actor's conduct is reasonable discipline of minors by parents, guardians, teachers,
or other persons in loco parentis;
(4) When the actor's conduct is reasonable discipline of persons in custody under the laws of
the state;
(5) When the actor's conduct is justified for
any other reason under the laws of this state.
1973

76-2-402.

Force in defense of person — Forcible
felony defined.
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using
force against another when and to the extent that he
reasonably believes that such force is necessary to
defend himself or a third person against such other's
imminent use of unlawful force; however, a person is
justified in using force which is intended or likely to
cause death or serious bodilv injury only if he reason-

185
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receipt of the list provided herein or at such other
time as the court may direct, shall file and serve the
defendant with the addresses, as particularly as are
known to him, of the witnesses the state proposes to
offer to contradict or impeach the defendant s alibi
evidence
(2) The defendant and prosecuting attorney shall
be under a continuing duty to disclose the names and
addresses of additional witnesses which come to the
ittention of either party after filing their alibi witness lists
(3) If a defendant or prosecuting attorney fails to
comply with the requirements of this section the
court may exclude evidence offered to establish or
rebut alibi However, the defendant may always testify on his own behalf concerning alibi
(4) The court may, for good cause shown, waive the
requirements of this section
1980
77-14-3. Insanity or diminished mental capacity
— Notice requirement — Expert testimony.
(1) When a defendant proposes to offer evidence
that he is not guilty as a result of insanity or that he
had diminished mental capacity or any other testimony of a mental health expert to establish mental
state, he shall, at the time of arraignment or as soon
afterward as practicable, but not fewer than 30 days
before the trial, file and serve the prosecuting attorney with written notice of his intention to claim the
defense
(2) When either the prosecution or the defense intends to call any mental health expert to testify at
trial regarding a defendant's mental state, excluding
rebuttal testimony, the expert shall be required to
prepare a written report of findings, and counsel intending to call the expert shall provide a copy of any
report to opposing counsel as soon as practicable, but
act less than ten davs before trial
(3) If the defendant fails to meet the requirements
ofSubsection (1), he may not introduce evidence tending to establish the defense unless the court for good
cause shown otherwise orders
(4) Nothing in this section is intended to require
the admission of evidence not otherwise admissible

77-14-5

tion within 30 days after the court's order, and shall
prepare and provide to the court prosecutor and defense counsel a written report concerning the condition of the defendant
(3) Within ten days after receipt of the report from
the examiners, but not later than five days before the
tnal of the case, or at any other time the court directs, the prosecuting attorney shall file and serve
upon the defendant a notice of rebuttal of the defense
of mental illness, which shall contain the names of
witnesses the prosecuting attorney proposes to call m
rebuttal
(4) The reports of the Utah State Hospital or any
other independent examine** may be admissible in evidence upon the stipulation of the prosecution and
defense
(5) Examiners appointed under Subsection (1)
shall be allowed fees that the court determines to be
reasonable The fees allowed by this section shall be
paid by t h e county, except when t h e offense is a state
offense, the state shall pay all of the expense Travel
expenses shall be charged to the county where prosecution is commenced Examination of defendants
charged with violation of municipal or county ordinances shall be charged to the entity commencing the
prosecution
(6) This section does not prevent any party from
producing any other testimony as to the mental condition of the defendant Expert witnesses who are not
appointed by the court are not entitled to compensation under Subsection (5) except on order of the court,
for good cause shown
(7) This section does not require the admission of
evidence not otherwise admissible
1986

77-14-5. Hearing on mental condition of defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity — Placement under Psychiatric
Security Review Board and commitment to state hospital — Jurisdiction
of board — Procedures.
(1) When a jury renders a verdict or a court enters
a finding of "not guilty by reason of insanity," the
court shall then conduct a hearing within five days to
determine if the defendant is presently mentally ill
The defense counsel and prosecutors mav request fur
1986
ther evaluations and may present testimony from
77-14-4. Mental examination of defendant — those examiners
Appointment, report, testimony, and
(2) After the hearing and upon consideration of the
compensation of examiners — Cooperrecord, if the court finds bv clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is still mentally ill and beation of defendant — Notice of rebuttal
cause of that mental illness presents a substantial
— Admissibility of other evidence.
danger to himself or others, the court shall order him
Q) When the court receives notice that a defendant
placed under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Secuintends to claim that he is not guilty as the result of
rity Review Board established under Section 77-38-2
msanity or that he had diminished mental capacity,
and committed to the Utah State Hospital
the court shall appoint two examiners qualified in
farensic mental health to examine the defendant and (3) The defendant shall be under the jurisdiction of
the Psychiatric Security Review Board until he is disinvestigate his mental condition Thev shall testify at
therequestof the court or either party m any pro- charged m accordance with Chapter 38 of this title
ceeding m which the testimonv is otherwise admissi- The board's jurisdiction mav not extend beyond the
maximum sentence the court finds the defendant
ble. When the defendant is held in jail pending trial,
could have received had he been found guilty of the
the evaluations may be conducted in the jail
offense charged At the time the Psychiatric Security
(2) The defendant shall make himself available
Review Board's jurisdiction expires, involuntary civil
ad fully cooperate in the examination by the court
©pointed examiners and any other independent ex- commitment proceedings may be instituted in accor
dance with Part 2, Chapter 12, Title 62A
auners for the defense and the prosecuting attorney
If the defendant fails to make himself available and
(4) With regard to persons who have been commit
felly cooperate, and that failure is established to the ted to the Utah State Hospital bv the court under this
atisfaction of the court at a hearing prior to trial the
section prior to Jul} 1 1989 the effective date of this
act the following procedures applv
defendant is barred from presenting expert testimonv
relating to his defense of mental llln^s at the tnal of
(a) Within 60 dav<? after that date the supenn
the case The examiners shah complete the examinatendent of the L t a h ^tate Hospital or lvs desig
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78-1-3. Effect of act on election functions.
(1) Any justice or judge of a court of record, whose
taction to office was effective on or before July 1
1985, shall hold the office for the remainder of the
tenn to which he was elected The justice or judge is
subject to an unopposed retention election as provided
by law at the general election immediately preceding
the expiration of the respective term of office
(2) Any justice or judge of a court of record whose
appointment to office was effective on or before July
1,1985, is subject to an unopposed retention election
is provided by law at the first general election held
mote than three years after the date of the appointment
(3) Any justice or judge of a court of record whose
appointment to office was effective after July 1,1985
a subject to an unopposed retention election as profided by law at the first general election held more
than three years after the date of the appointment

(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a
member of the Supreme Court, the chief justice has
additional duties as provided by law
(6) There is created the office of associate chief justice The term of office of the associate chief justice is
two years The associate chief justice may serve in
that office no more than two successive terms The
associate chief justice shall be elected by a majority
vote of the members of the Supreme Court and shall
be allocated duties as the chief justice determines If
the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief
justice The chief justice, where not inconsistent with
law, may delegate responsibilities to the associate
chief justice
1988
78-2-1.5,78-2-1.6.

Repealed.

1971,1981

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
1988
answer questions of state law certified by a court of
the United States
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
CHAPTER 2
issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its
SUPREME COURT
orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction
Section
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction,
78-2-1 Number of justices — Term — Chief justice
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over
and associate chief justice — Selection
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals,
and functions
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the
78-2-15, 78-2-1 6 Repealed
Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the
78-2-2 Supreme Court jurisdiction
Court of Appeals,
78-2-3 Repealed
(c) discipline of lawyers,
78-24
Supreme Court — Rulemaking judges pro
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Comtempore, and practice of law
mission,
78-2-5
Repealed
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudica78-2-6 Appellate court administrator
tive proceedings originating with
78-2-7 Repealed
d) the Public Service Commission,
78-2-7 5 Service of sheriff to court
(n) the State Tax Commission,
78-2-8 to 78-2-14 Repealed
(in) the Board of State Lands and For78-2-1. Number of justices — Term — Chief jusestry,
(IV) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, or
tice and associate chief justice — Se(v) the state engineer,
lection and functions.
(0 final orders and decrees of the district court
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be apagencies under Subsection (e),
pointed initially to serve until the first general elec(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of
tion held more than three years after the effective
record holding a statute of the United States or
fcteof the appointment Thereafter the term of office
this state unconstitutional on its face under the
of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten years and
Constitution of the United States or the Utah
commences on the first Monday in January next fol
Constitution,
lowing the date of election A justice whose term ex(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of
pies may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council
record involving a charge of a first degree or capi•nul a successor is appointed and qualified
tal felony,
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a
(D appeals from the district court involving a
dnef justice from among the members of the court by
conviction of a first degree or capital felony, and
majority vote of all justices The term of the office of
(j) orders, judgments and decrees of any court
duef justice is four years The chief justice may not
of record over which the Court of Appeals does
«ve successive terms The chief justice may resign
not have original appellate jurisdiction
from the office of chief justice without resigning from
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court
the Supreme Court The chief justice may be removed of Appeals any of the matters over which the Sufrom the office of chief justice by a majority vote of all preme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, exjustices of the Supreme Court
cept
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of
within 30 days of a vacancy in that office the assoan interlocutory order of a court of record involvciate chief justice shall act as chief justice until a
ing a charge of a capital felony,
dnef justice is elected under this section If the asso
(b) election and voting contests
oate chief justice is unable or unwilling to act as
(c) reapportionment of election districts
duef justice, the most senior justice shall act as chief
(d) retention or removal of public officers
usace until a chief justice i& elected under this sec
(e) general water adjudication,
tan.
(f) taxation and revenue and

the appointment Th»*p»nfter. the term of office of a
judge of the Court ot Appeals i«? six years and commences on the first Monday in January, next following the date of election. A judge whose term expires
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until
a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction
thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels
78-2-3. Repealed.
1986 shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, j u d g e s of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The
pro t e m p o r e , a n d p r a c t i c e of law.
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of proce(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall electa
dure and evidence for use in the courts of the state
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The presiding judge from among the members of the court
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is
evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the
may serve in that office no more than two successive
Legislature.
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Conan acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or
stitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to incapacity of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the
perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a
admitted to practice law in Utah.
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge
shall:
practice of law, including admission to practice law
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to
panels;
the practice of law.
1986
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
78-2-5. Repealed.
1988
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the
Court
of Appeals; and
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator.
(d> carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme
The appellate court administrator shall appoint
Court and the Judicial Council.
clerks and support staff as necessary for the operation
(5)
Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. The
1988
duties of the clerks and support staff shall be estab- same as for the Supreme Court.
lished by the appellate court administrator, and
78-2a-3. Court of A p p e a l s j u r i s d i c t i o n .
powers established by rule of the Supreme Court.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue

(g> those matters described in Subsection (3Ma)
through (f).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings.
1989

1986

78-2-7.

Repealed.

1986

78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to c o u r t
The court may at any time require the attendance
and services of any sheriff in the state.
1988
78-2-8 to 78-2-14.

Repealed.

1986,1988

CHAPTER 2a
COURT OF A P P E A L S
Section
78-2a-l.
78-2a-2.
78-2a-3.
78-2a-4.
78-2a-5.

Creation — Seal.
Number of judges — Terms — Functions —
Filing fees.
Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
Review of actions by Supreme Court.
Location of Court of Appeals.

78-2a-l. Creation — Seal.
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals is a court of record and
shall have a seal.
1986
78-2a-2.

Number of judges — Terms — Functions — Filing fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges.
The term of appointment to office as a judge of the
Court of Appeals is until the first general election
held more than three years after the effective date of

all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over.
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of
adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
subdivisions ot the state or other local agencies;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except
those from the small claims department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record in criminal cases, except those involving a
charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from district court in criminal
cases, except those involving a conviction of a
first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs involving: a criminal conviction, except those involving a first degree or capital felony;

sions of this rule and all other rules of appellate procedure
(Amended, effective January 1 1987 )
Rule 41. Certification of questions of law by
United States courts.
(a) Authorization to answer questions of law.
The Utah Supreme Court may in its discretion answer a question of Utah law certified to it by a court
of the United States when requested to do so by such
certifying court acting m accordance with the provisions of this rule, but only if the state of the law of
Utah applicable to a proceeding before the certifying
court is uncertain and answering the certified question will not unduly interfere with the Utah Supreme
Court's regular functioning or be inconsistent with
the timely and orderly development of the decisional
law of the state
(b) Procedure to invoke. Any court referred to m
Paragraph (a) may invoke this rule by entering an
order of certification as described in this rule. When
invoking this rule, the certifying court may act either
sua sponte or upon a motion by any party
(c) Certification order.
(1) A certification order shall be directed to the
Utah Supreme Court and shall state
d) the question of law to be answered,
(n) that the question certified is a controlling issue of law in a proceeding pending before the certifying court, and
(in) that there appears to be no controlling Utah law
(2) The order shall also set forth all facts
which are relevant to the determination of the
question certified and which show the nature of
the controversy, the context in which the question arose, and the procedural steps by which the
question was framed.
(3) The certifying court may also include in
the order any additional reasons for its entry of
the certification order that are not otherwise apparent.
(d) Form of certification order; submission of
record. A certification order shall be prepared by the
certifying court, signed by the judge presiding over
the proceeding giving rise to the certification order,
and forwarded to the Utah Supreme Court by the
clerk of the certifying court under its official seal The
court, m its discretion, may then require that certified copies of all or any portion of the record before
the certifying court be filed with this court if, in the
opinion of this court, the record or a portion thereof
may be necessary in determining whether to accept
the certified question or in answering that question.
(e) Acceptance or rejection of certification.
Upon filing of the certification order and accompanying papers with the clerk, the court shall promptly
enter an order either accepting or rejecting the question certified to it, and the clerk shall thereupon
serve copies of this court's order upon the certifying
court and all parties identified in the certification
order If the court accepts the question for adjudication, the court will set out in the order of acceptance
(l) the specific question or questions accepted, (n)
those portions of the record which shall be copied and
filed with the clerk of this court, and (m) a schedule
for the filing of briefs and for oral argument by the
parties The form of briefs and proceedings on oral
argument shall thereafter be governed by Rules 21
through 40 of these rules It mav be presumed that
the court will give the matter expedited treatment

<D Fees. The fees for filing an order of certification
in this court shall be the same as for filing and docketing a notice of appeal in a civil appeal in the court
Snd the cost shall be equally divided between the par
ties to the cause unless otherwise ordered by the certifying court in its order of certification
(g> Association of counsel. Upon acceptance by
the court of the question of law presented by the certification order, counsel for the parties not licensed to
Practice law in the state ol Utah shall associate a
Member m good standing of the Utah State Bar in
Connection with all further proceedings before the
Court
(h) Issuance of opinion on certified question!
The court will issue a written opinion that will be
Published and reported A copy of the opinion shall be
transmitted by the clerk under the seal of the court to
the certifying court and to the parties identified ifl
the certification order
(Added, effective January 1, 1987 )
TITLE VI. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO COURT OF APPEALS.
&ule 42. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of Court of Appeals.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of t
Judgment, an order, and a decree (herein referred to
^> 'decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Sofcreme Court of Utah
(Added, effective April 20, 1987 )
#ule 43, Considerations governing review (j(
certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter i
hght, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted
Only when there are special and important reason
therefor The following, while neither controlling nor
Wholly measuring the court's discretion, indicate the
character of reasons that will be considered
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals ha
rendered a decision in conflict with a decision 4
another panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law,
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
decided a question of state or federal law in i
way that is in conflict with a decision of thu
court,
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals ha
rendered a decision that has so far departed frai
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedmgs or has so far sanctioned such a departure bj
a lower court as to call for an exercise of ths
court's power of supervision, or
(4) WTien the Court of Appeals has decided a
important question of municipal, state, orfedeni
law which has not been, but should be, settled bj
this court
(Added, effective April 20, 1987;
Rule 44. Certification and transmission cf
record; filing; parties.
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and »
vice. Counsel for the petitioner shall, within the tu»
provided by Rule 45 pay the certiorari docketing f*
and file, with proof of service as provided by Rule2L
ten copies of a petition which shall comply m all r*
spects with Rule 46 The case then will be placed a.
the certiorari docket of the court Counsel for thepefr
tioner shall serve four copies of the petition oncost
sel for each partv separately represented It shall fr

